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Abstract
In response to Vivanti’s ‘Ask The Editor…’ paper [Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 50(2), 691–693], we 
argue that the use of language in autism research has material consequences for autistic people including stigmatisation, 
dehumanisation, and violence. Further, that the debate in the use of person-first language versus identity-first language 
should centre first and foremost on the needs, autonomy, and rights of autistic people, so in to preserve their rights to self-
determination. Lastly, we provide directions for future research.
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Introduction
In this article, we expand on the conversation regarding 
the use of person first language (PFL), and identity first 
language (IFL), by responding to the editorial by Vivanti 
(2020). Vivanti attempts to answer the question “what is 
the most appropriate way to talk about individual with a 
diagnosis of autism?” (Vivanti 2020). We begin by reiterat-
ing the core arguments around PFL and IFL as highlighted 
by Vivanti, and by reiterating the strengths of the article—
such as its focus on the material implications of language 
for autistic people. We then expand further on the implica-
tions of linguistic framings which separate autistic people 
from their autism—namely violence. We highlight how the 
article might have been strengthened with further engage-
ment with the growing body of critical autism research. We 
further expand on the rights-based approach to language 
Vivanti briefly discusses, highlighting considerations for 
communication adjustments, the externalisation of vulner-
ability, and that self-determination should be the centre of 
any discussion of disability. Lastly, we discuss the direction 
of future empirical work which might address any perceived 
ambiguity around the language verbal, nor non-speaking 
autistic people prefer.1 In doing so, we highlight that autistic 
people (across all ranges of speaking, and with or without 
learning disabilities) should be directing the language used 
to describe us. It should also be noted that speaking and 
non-speaking is not dichotomous because autistic people can 
move between speaking in some environments or spaces and 
not in others, and this is a dynamic and not static group 
(Peña 2019). Importantly, non-speaking does not mean non 
communicative, or non-thinking (Peña 2019).
In his ‘Ask the Editor’ piece, Vivanti (2020) provides a 
brief history of the language used to describe disabilities, 
including the tensions between IFL (e.g. “autistic person”) 
and PFL (e.g. “person with autism”). The author details how 
PFL (which emerged in the 1970s) was used to put the per-
son before the disability—to emphasise “the person’s unique 
combinations of strengths, needs, and experiences (both 
related and unrelated to their disability)… by literally plac-
ing the person before the disability” (Vivanti 2020: 1). IFL, 
the author argues, “is increasingly endorsed as an expres-
sion of positive social identity whereby language historically 
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used to dehumanize and marginalise… is redeployed as a 
form of empowerment” (Vivanti 2020: 2).
We would first like to commend Vivanti for the positive 
contributions of his editorial. The very fact that the Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders is addressing this 
sometimes-perplexing issue is most welcome. Above all, we 
were especially glad to see Vivanti recognise the real-world 
implications of language choice: how it can ‘influence soci-
etal perceptions, public policy, clinical practice and research 
directions’ (Vivanti 2020: 1). Later, too, he reminds read-
ers that all disabled people—including autistic people—are 
vulnerable to experiencing violations of their human rights 
and highlights how non-speaking autistic people may have 
additional difficulties in advocating for their rights, and may 
therefore be ‘more at risk to be treated as “less than people”’ 
(Vivanti 2020: 2). It is both right and important that these 
issues are considered by researchers working in the field of 
autism research and the journals who publish them.
Finding Consensus
We would like to acknowledge, early on, that currently 
there is no clear consensus in literature, regarding the most 
preferred language from autistic people—as alluded to by 
Vivanti (2020). However there is, we believe, clear consen-
sus on the least preferred—and most offensive—language: 
the specific person-first formulation of “person with autism” 
or “person with autism spectrum disorder/condition” (Bury 
et al. 2020; Kapp et al. 2013; Kenny et al. 2016). Perhaps 
confusingly, while “autistic” and “autistic person” remain 
the preferred term by largest agreement (totalling 49% in a 
recent study by Bury et al. 2020), “on the autism spectrum” 
has shown to be the least polarizing overall (ibid.).
A person “on the spectrum” is essentially, a person first 
formulation and yet is found to be substantially less offensive 
than “with autism” by the autistic community (Bury et al. 
2020; Kapp et al. 2013; Kenny et al. 2016; Sinclair 2013). 
This poses a conundrum, and potentially lends support to 
the argument that a move completely away from PFL may 
be premature (Bury et al. 2020; Vivanti 2020). However, 
linguistic analysis may help to explain the different connota-
tions that these two formulations (“person with autism” and 
“person on the autism spectrum”) carry.
The first case (“person with autism”) involves the noun 
(“person”) followed by “with + noun” (here: “autism”). 
Other nouns (or noun phrases) that may be substituted in the 
second position for “autism” include those such as “cancer”, 
“liver disease”, “a headache”, “Covid-19”, etc. This is com-
mon formulation used to signify the presence of some kind 
of pathology or illness. In the second case (“person on the 
spectrum/autism spectrum”) represents a far less common 
formula, and as such already carries fewer connotations. 
However, the “…on the spectrum” can be substituted with 
prepositional phrases such as “on the cricket team”, “on the 
engineering course”, or “on holiday”, etc. These substitu-
tions all denote position of some sort and provide a means of 
both locating the subject (the “person”) and identifying them 
as a member of a smaller group of people (i.e. the members 
of the category “person” is far greater than those belonging 
to the category of “person on the forecourt”).
We agree with Bottema-Beutel et  al. (2020: 3), that 
‘what people say or write produces specific versions of the 
world, one’s self, and others, and language conveys, shapes, 
and perpetuates ideologies’. We would therefore also like 
to lend our support to their suggestion that “person on the 
autism spectrum” be used as a less offending middle ground 
between two more politically entrenched ways of talking 
about autism only where such a compromise is necessitated. 
In doing so, we reject the assertion by Vivanti that it is too 
early to reject PFL, if he means the continued use of “person 
with autism” because a not insubstantial body of literature is 
showing that this is both least preferred and most offensive, 
and there are more preferred, and less offensive alternatives 
available.
The Material Risk of Language for Autistic 
People
Autism is both a “real” phenomenon, and constituted from 
social meaning, culture, language, and common understand-
ing (Davidson and Orsini 2013; Nadesan 2013; Yergeau 
2018). This means that language shapes our understanding 
of autism, and can have risks, as acknowledged by Vivanti 
(2020). Real world risks to autistic people are clear, as 
evidenced by the heightened incidence rates of self-harm, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal ideation and death by 
suicide among autistic people, compared to a non-autistic 
population (Cassidy et al. 2014; Cassidy and Rodgers 2017; 
Haruvi-Lamdan et al. 2020; Hedley et al. 2018; Hirvikoski 
et al. 2016), and the high rate of interpersonal victimisation 
(Griffiths et al. 2019; Weiss and Fardella 2018). Terminol-
ogy around autism and, specifically, the language used to 
refer to autistic people may have a significant role to play in 
those risks, as language frames concepts, thought, percep-
tion and stigma (Gernsbacher 2017). Indeed, there has been 
a history both within academia (Gernsbacher 2007; Cowen 
2009) and in news reporting of autism (Holton et al. 2014; 
Huws and Jones 2011) of using dehumanising and stigma-
tising language. PFL was originally designed in the 1970s 
as a response to the dehumanisation and violence towards 
autistic and disabled people of earlier decades. The thinking 
of the time was that it may humanise disabled people in a 
way IFL did not, in the face of institutional violence against 
disabled people because it is a formulation which puts the 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
1 3
person first (Dunn and Andrews 2015), yet emerging evi-
dence has not found it to be efficacious (Gomes 2018). The 
changes in formulation, historically, have not prevented vio-
lence against autistic people which is still occurring despite 
moving between formulations. It is important to note that 
the original use of IFL was not used to reflect the preference 
of autistic people but rather reflected the medical language 
of the time, whereas the current IFL movement reflect the 
ever-growing push from autistic and disabled people for 
autonomy (Botha et al. 2020; Dunn and Andrews 2015). 
Further, PFL may have unintended consequences which we 
discuss. We argue that this editorial has not gone quite far 
enough in analysing the potentially damaging implications 
of at least, some formulations of person-first language.
Linguistic framing influences the way that people concep-
tualise social matters, political attitudes, events, and situa-
tions (Bergen 2012; Reali et al. 2016). Metaphors are one 
of the linguistic tools used to frame, for example mental 
illness, as an opponent (Reali et al. 2016). Further, they do 
not serve as ornamental features of language, and instead 
play an active role in conceptualising reality (Reali et al. 
2016). In fact, when considering how people frame depres-
sion for example, Reali et al. (2016) found that mere expo-
sure to linguistic cues is enough to produce effects on first 
impression, biasing participants towards making certain 
interpretations over other available interpretations. There 
might be other consequences for these types of framings—
most importantly, violence against autistic people. Cam-
paigns and language around autism have had “problematic 
discursive figuration of autism as somehow separate from 
the autistic person” (McGuire 2016: 160), something PFL 
serves to solidify. Person-first language literally serves to 
drive a wedge between the person (good), and the autism 
(bad) (McGuire 2016).
Consider the New York University Child Study Center’s 
‘public service campaign’ consisting of ‘ransom notes posted 
on large billboards, on kiosks, and at construction sites in 
New York City and published in Newsweek and New York 
magazine’ (Kras 2010: n.p.), written from the perspective of 
‘autism’ that had kidnapped innocent children. Autism here 
was positioned outside of the child them self, as a malevo-
lent force that would ‘destroy’ their life- a common narra-
tive in autism (McGuire 2016). Similar themes can be found 
in several publicity videos for the charity Autism Speaks. 
In one, entitled “I am Autism”, ‘a satanic-sounding voice 
declares “I am autism” and proceeds to brag about all the 
destruction he will cause families’ (Nicolaidis 2012: 504). 
More consideration needs to be given to what metaphors, 
framings and ways of talking about autism the linguistic sep-
aration creates. If autism can be separated from the person 
(a goal of PFL), then metaphors around the destruction of 
it may be used without consideration for the life attached—
autism becomes an opponent, a disembodied force. In fact, 
the United States enacted an autism bill named the “Combat-
ing Autism Act”, which many saw as congress “declaring 
war on autism” (McGuire 2016). We are reminded of the 
apt quote by Anne McGuire “When autism is not a life but 
a shell surrounding life, advocacy is positioned to see nor-
mal kids, as per the opening epigraph, that simply need to 
be ‘cracked’ out” (2016). Often, it is forgotten autism only 
exists as a person.
The implications of the semantic separation of autism and 
people are most clear in cases of filicide. Autism is a risk 
factor for ‘altruistic’ filicide (ASAN 2020; Palermo 2003), 
and in a review of 26 filicide-suicides reported in newspa-
pers between 1982 and 2010 in the USA, 54% of victims 
were autistic (Coorg and Tournay 2013), despite making 
up between only 1 and 2% of the population (Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2009). In the past five years ‘over 650 people with 
disabilities have been murdered by their parents, relatives 
or caregivers’ (ASAN 2020: 4). These, of course, are just 
the reported cases. Of the five possible categorisations for 
the murder of a child by their parents, ‘altruistic filicide’ is 
the by far the most common (Palermo 2003; Sobsey 2001), 
and ‘in cases that involve disabled persons, the concept of 
altruistic filicide may dangerously overlap the idea of mercy 
killing’ (Palermo 2003: 47). McGuire (2016) highlights how 
in cases of filicide, parents often fall back on the same lin-
guistic separation—I loved my child very much, but I hated 
autism, and wanted autism out of my life. More disturb-
ing, was an ideology that by killing an autistic child, the 
child would somehow be complete (non-autistic) in heaven 
(McGuire 2016). This is clear in testimony on the killing 
of Katie McCarron, in which the mother claims she was 
not killing her autistic daughter, but rather autism itself 
(Sampier 2008). Conceptual (and linguistic) separation of 
the individual and ‘their autism’ hurts all those on the spec-
trum, perhaps especially those who are multiply disabled 
and, as Vivanti pointed out, often even less able to assert 
their human rights independently. By separating autism from 
the person, we formulate an existence or possibility of that 
life without autism (McGuire 2016), yet autism cannot, onti-
cally speaking, ever be separate from a person: to combat 
autism, is to combat autistic people. While historically PFL 
was intended to humanise and acknowledge the individuality 
of each person, there remain concerns about the impact of 
such semantic separations of people from their disabilities 
(Dunn and Andrews 2015).
Superficial Engagement with Autistic 
Scholarship
Whilst we recognise that Vivanti’s (2020) original editorial 
was not designed to be a comprehensive examination of the 
literature, we would like to note one serious limitation in its 
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lack of engagement with the literature produced by autis-
tic scholars addressing these issues (such as Arnold 2017; 
Chapman 2019, 2020; Chown 2019; Graby 2015; Milton in 
Milton and Timimi 2016; Woods and Waldock 2020; Sin-
clair 2013; Singer 1999, 2017; Walker 2012). Our response, 
in part, attempts to add to that body of (already substantial) 
work. We were gratified to note Vivanti’s mention of the 
disability rights movement when providing background for 
the use of person-first language: bringing this to the atten-
tion of the journal’s readership is commendable. However, 
for an article that, on the surface, appears to argue for the 
importance of remembering that autistic people ‘are people 
first’ (Vivanti 2020: 1), it seems a shame that the central 
tenet of disability rights activity—‘nothing about us without 
us’ (Charlton 2004)—has been overlooked in practice within 
the editorial’s discussion.
It is now increasingly recognised that autism research 
both greatly benefits from autistic input, and is simultane-
ously, sorely lacking in it (Chown et al. 2017; Gillespie-
Lynch et al. 2017; Gowen et al. 2019; Happé and Frith 2020; 
Milton 2014; Milton and Bracher 2013; Nicolaidis 2012; 
Pellicano 2014; Pellicano et al. 2014; Pellicano and Stears 
2011; Woods and Waltz 2019). Yet this is not for a lack of 
autistic scholars or self-advocates working in a participa-
tory capacity alongside non-autistic researchers. There is 
a lack of nuance, in Vivanti’s (2020) editorial, around the 
representation of the (so-called) neurodiversity movement’s 
conceptualisation of autism that would have benefitted from 
stronger engagement with autistic voices. Vivanti (2020: 1) 
claims, for example, that the ‘neurodiversity perspective… 
sees autism as an expression of cultural diversity, rather than 
pathology’. This is simply not true. From a neurodiversity 
perspective, autism is not a cultural phenomenon , it is a bio-
logical one. The concept of neurodiversity simply highlights 
that there is s dispersion of cognitive and biological function 
in humans. While some have embraced an autistic cultural 
identity, ‘neurodiversity’ more accurately refers to biological 
(in this case, neurological) human diversity (Singer 1999, 
2017; Walker 2012). Likewise, whilst the neurodiversity per-
spective does not view autism as pathological (as Vivanti 
2020, rightly asserted), it is in full recognition of the many 
ways in which autistic people can be disabled, it just does not 
ascribe disability solely within the individual: an important 
factor that is lost when autism or neurodiversity is spoken 
about as a simply being cultural diversity (Nadesan 2013).
Again, when returning to the discussion of appropriate 
language, Vivanti (2020: 1) explains that:
Identity-first language (e.g., autistic person, blind per-
son) is considered as an appropriate expression of this 
cultural shift [to a neurodiversity perspective] by many 
self-advocates and scholars, as it counteracts the risk 
that separating the individual from the diagnosis (as 
in the expression “person with autism”) perpetuates 
the societal view that something is wrong about the 
diagnosis, potentially leading to an internalization of 
inferiority for those who receive the diagnosis.
Whilst we applaud the underscoring of the risks attached 
to person-first language, we feel a significant detail has been 
misunderstood. A neurodiversity approach proposes not a 
‘cultural shift’ but a paradigmatic one (Chapman 2019; 
Walker 2012): away from one that pathologises neurological 
difference. Person-first language belongs to the pathology 
paradigm and, as such, ‘implicitly accepts and reinforces the 
assumption that Autism is intrinsically a problem, a Some-
thing-Wrong-With-You’ (Walker 2012: n.p.). It affects how 
physicians ‘think of our patients’ and implicitly encourages 
‘family members to love an imagined non-autistic child that 
was never born, forgetting about the real person who exists 
in front of us’ (Nicolaidis 2012: 505).
Human Rights and Vulnerability
Vivanti also addresses human rights, correctly emphasis-
ing that each autistic person, no matter the severity of their 
impairment, is entitled to respect for their human rights. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD 2008) however, goes beyond 
respect of disabled person’s human rights; it requires that 
disabled people are guaranteed the full enjoyment of their 
human rights without distinction (CRPD 2008: preamble, 
our emphasis). This challenges traditional, paternalistic 
approaches to disability which portrays impairment as an 
inherent vulnerability (Celik 2017). Article 8 requires that 
states combat stereotypes, such as the assumption made here 
that non-speaking adults are ‘less equipped to advocate for 
themselves’ (Vivanti 2020: 693), while article 5 requires 
reasonable accommodation to ensure non-discrimination in 
the exercise of convention rights. For non-speaking adults, 
this includes the recognition and use of alternative modes of 
communication to facilitate self-advocacy (Nicolaidis et al. 
2015).
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
similarly moved towards a legal understanding of vulner-
ability that moves away from it being an inherent condition 
(Arnardóttir 2017). In Alajos Kiss v Hungary, for example, 
the court recognises that ‘such groups were historically sub-
ject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their 
social exclusion’ (Alajos Kiss v Hungary 2010: 42). That is, 
the basis of harm is the exclusion of groups of people based 
on pervasive and harmful stereotypes (Arnardóttir 2017). 
Further, the ECtHR follows the CRPD by placing a positive 
obligation on the state to remove barriers to participation 
through reasonable accommodation (Guberina v Croatia 
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2016). To ensure the inclusion of a broader range of autistic 
people in research, this may include co-creation of survey 
instruments to ensure accessibility for the widest range of 
participants, using graphics and simple language, and offer-
ing definitions and clarification of more complex terminol-
ogy (Nicolaidis et al. 2020).
A human rights-based approach must not reinforce sys-
tems which create vulnerability, including systems of lan-
guage which perpetrate stereotypes and, by implication, cat-
egorise people as vulnerable. Although Vivanti avoids the 
use of the terms high and low functioning, the use of other 
epithets such as ‘most impaired end of the spectrum’ and 
‘minimally verbal individuals’(Vivanti: 692) still implies 
vulnerability is linked to specific functional markers rather 
than social context. The term ‘minimally verbal’ is, itself, 
one that has a basis in linguistics research, such as that of 
Tager-Flusberg and Kasari (2013). However, whilst the term 
is meant as descriptive, large inconsistencies exist in how it 
is applied, and according to which linguistic and paralinguis-
tic criteria: perhaps in part due to the heterogeneity of the 
non-speaking autistic population (Koegel et al. 2020). We 
feel that sweeping uses of such unclear terms as this, which 
carry negative connotations ought to be avoided so as not to 
endorse or perpetuate stereotypes because they may become 
a euphemism for ‘low functioning’. Further, non-speaking 
does not tend to mean non- or minimally-verbal because 
non-speaking autistic people still tend to communicate in 
less socially valued ways.
The harm caused by stereotypes is addressed in Kenny 
(2016) and is an area where there is clear agreement between 
the respondent groups in the survey. When discussing the 
high and low functioning autism label, all groups indicated 
that they view these terms as a misleading and value-based 
judgement on a person’s ability to function (Kenny et al. 
2016). Assumptions based on these labels minimise the dif-
ficulties of those who appear high functioning and underes-
timate the ability of those viewed as low functioning (Kenny 
et al. 2016). One of the family and friends group makes 
specific reference of non-verbal communication, stating that 
they find ‘the idea of language being a definer of ‘function’ 
out-dated and frankly quite arrogant’ (Kenny et al. 2016: 
449). There is a significant risk that ‘minimally verbal’ and 
‘most impaired end of spectrum’ become replacement catch-
all terms for the stereotyping autistic people are actively try-
ing to escape in eschewing functional labels. It is vital, then, 
to challenge approaches which may, albeit unintentionally, 
perpetrate negative stereotypes.
We welcome Vivanti’s concern that tensions over lan-
guage may contribute to the privileging of one group within 
the autism community over another (692), but do not share 
agreement with his solutions. Researchers, practitioners, 
and clinicians discounting narratives of minorities in favour 
privileging their own perspectives is a danger often seen 
in minority-based work (McKinnon 2017) and disability 
research (Wieseler 2020) and it constitutes a type of vio-
lence. Often autistic people who can and do engage with 
researchers are dismissed for not being autistic enough, 
while those who use few to no words are systematically 
kept out of research. Vivanti (2020) perpetuates this by 
arguing that the autistic people included in the samples of 
current research may have different perspectives on language 
because they are seen as being more able (which is conflated 
with being less autistic). Instead of dismissing current tes-
timony, we believe that the lack of representative evidence 
that involves a full spectrum of autistic people should be 
addressed by research approaches which are participatory 
or consensus building (Nicolaidis et al. 2015; Bertilsdotter 
Rosqvist et al. 2020).
The participatory approach used by Nicolaidis et  al. 
(2015) indicates that it is possible to create inclusive research 
and that the research can show commonality of experience 
across the spectrum of communication difficulties. For 
example, lack of reasonable accommodation to communi-
cation styles impacts on autonomy (Nicolaidis et al. 2015: 
828) among both respondents using assistive communica-
tion technology and those who have large vocabularies, who 
both felt they were condescended to and infantilised (828). 
Improved outcomes were created by the person providing 
care implementing reasonable adjustments, effective com-
munication and respecting autonomy of the person (829). 
Similarly, Bertilsdotter Rosqvist et al. (2020) highlight the 
possibilities of creating ‘autistic shared spaces’ (Bertilsdot-
ter Rosqvist et al. 2020: 168). Moving the focus of concern 
away from hierarchies and harmful divisions within the 
autism community (Hillary 2020) towards enabling equal 
participation of respondent groups that can help move away 
from stereotyping autistic people as fixed within their own 
‘bubbles’ (Bertilsdotter Rosqvist et al. 2020: 169). Allowing 
research to be guided by disabled people in a manner which 
respects inherent dignity of all disabled persons and allows 
them the freedom to make their own choices (CRPD: article 
3) is more consistent with a human-rights based approach.
Directions for Future Research
A common limitation of surveys include difficulty in reach-
ing the entire autism spectrum, as highlighted in the stud-
ies that address preferred language used to describe autism 
(Bury et al. 2020; Kenny et al. 2016). Reaching autistic 
populations at intersections with learning disabilities and 
situational mutism can be difficult, and the methods usually 
used are restrictive, and potentially exclude a representa-
tive sample. The sample methods used can often result in 
samples who use a wider vocabulary, were diagnosed later 
in life, and have higher educational attainment. However, 
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there is often also a troubling assumption that anyone who 
participates in surveys are typically verbal, and that those 
who are situationally mute, or non-speaking would not have 
taken part. Vivanti (2020) refers to ‘minimally verbal’ autis-
tic people but does not clarify whether they are referring 
to those with co-occurring learning disabilities, situational 
mutism, perceived developmental language delays, or a 
constellation of these characteristics. This casual conflation 
usually spans from the assumption that non-speaking autistic 
people, or those who are situationally mute always have a 
co-occurring learning disability, and cannot communicate in 
any method, because they do not always communicate ver-
bally. Further, researchers often categorise a heterogenous 
group of autistic people together based on the perception of 
one function-normative verbal communication. Yet 75% of 
autistic children with co-occurring situational mutism do 
not have learning disabilities (Steffenburg et al. 2018), while 
in the most complete census of any country to date, 20% of 
autistic people have a co-occurring learning disability (Kin-
near et al. 2019). There are intersections of these populations 
who might not use traditional communication, or use few to 
no words, and yet this nuance is rarely acknowledged. Not all 
people who do not use spoken language use no communica-
tion methods at all. It fails to acknowledge that non-speaking 
autistic adults are a similarly heterogenous group deserving 
of nuanced discussion. In future, rather than stereotyping a 
group of autistic people by a specific single, normative skill, 
perhaps researchers should point to a specific constellation 
of characteristics they are referring to.
To date, research has not collected information on this 
as there is an assumption if one takes part in a survey then 
they are automatically conventionally verbal, and further that 
they always have been. It should be noted that in a qualitative 
study that included adjustments to allow for the participa-
tion of those who do not communicate verbally, but may 
communicate through typing for example, there was still 
a preference for IFL (Botha et al. 2020). Ultimately, there 
needs to be more distinction when referring to autistic peo-
ple, less assumptions on behalf of researchers, and indeed, 
greater nuance and further research.
Further, there is a problematic divide issued on the basis 
of conventional verbal ability: Vivanti (2020) argues that 
PFL is purposed to counteract judgements made of these 
groups especially (those who are non-speaking) (Vivanti 
2020: 2). Firstly, autistic people are dehumanised by non-
autistic people, regardless of communication type (Cage 
et al. 2018). Secondly, there is no evidence that PFL effec-
tively humanises disabled people (Collier 2012). But most 
importantly, no autistic individual, regardless of how they 
communicate, should be so dehumanised that they require 
language emphasising their humanness. If autistic people 
who are verbal do not need PFL, but non-speaking autis-
tic people need it, is it because it is somehow harder to 
remember that non-speaking autistic individuals are human? 
As a society, rather than having to remind people of the fun-
damental humanness of a marginalised minority, we should 
instead be tackling the preconceived notions of those who 
need the reminder, that this is in fact, a person in front of 
them—something autistic people, both verbal and non-
speaking, have made clear (Botha et al. 2020).
Thus, with regards to concerns about sampling issues per-
haps the path forward is to conduct a replication study of the 
regularly cited Kenny et al. (2016) paper on language prefer-
ence, that includes expanded methods to reach a wider sam-
ple of the autism spectrum, using a participatory method that 
encompasses more of the autistic spectrum, and its intersec-
tionality. This replication could additionally ask two things: 
(1) how verbal they would currently consider themselves, 
and (2) how verbal they were as a child (as those who com-
municate conventionally as adults might not have done so 
as children), and the co-occurrence of learning disabilities 
and situational mutism. This would remove the perceived 
ambiguity of language preference according to perceived 
verbalness.
Further research should also aim to understand identity 
first and PFL with more nuance—including why the differ-
ent person first formulations ( “on the autism spectrum” 
is perceived as the least polarizing, while “on the autism” 
spectrum is routinely considered, with reasonable consen-
sus, to be the most offensive). Research could focus on the 
linguistic nuance in interpretation and meaning making of 
these formulations. What is arguably most important in 
these directions for future research is that it remains person 
centred. That is, research and practice are framed around 
the needs, wishes, and experiences of autistic individuals 
most particularly. Directions in how we talk about autism 
in research ought to follow the guidance of autistic peo-
ple themselves. In the meantime, while further research is 
needed, it should certainly be heeded that the autistic com-
munity does not tend to favour “with autism”.
Conclusion
There will not always be consensus on what autism is or how 
we should talk about autistic people—even among autistic 
people ourselves—but to ignore those autistic voices that 
have broken through into the academy lest they not be rep-
resentative of every single autistic person is short-sighted. 
Linguistic framing, including the use of PFL, has material 
consequences for the autistic community, especially those 
who are non-speaking. The priority of research should be to 
centre autistic people (both speaking and non-speaking, and 
with, and without learning disabilities) in the conversation 
around the language used to describe autism and autistic 
people. If current studies are not representative enough of 
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the entire autistic population the solution is to conduct more 
research. We would urge Vivanti and contributors to the 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders to engage 
more fully with critical autism studies and other autistic aca-
demic voices on all matters of autism research for the mutual 
benefit of the both the autistic and the research communities.
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